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In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument (DA, for short) based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I present then a novel model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. This last model also encapsulates both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers' models. Lastly I argue that this novel analogy leads to an intrinsically different conclusion than the one arising from the standard Doomsday argument​[1]​.


1. The Carter-Leslie View

Let us begin by sketching briefly the Doomsday argument. The argument can be described as a reasoning leading to a bayesian shift, from an analogy between what has been termed the two urn case​[2]​ and the corresponding human situation​[3]​. Consider, first, the two urn case. According to Bostrom's (1997) presentation, it runs as follows:

Imagine that two big urns are put in front of you, and you know that one of them contains ten balls and the other a million, but you are ignorant as to which is which. You know the balls in each urn are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 ... etc. Now you take a ball at random from the left urn, and it is number 7. Clearly, this is a strong indication that that urn contains only ten balls. If originally the odds were fifty-fifty, a swift application of Bayes' theorem gives you the posterior probability that the left urn is the one with only ten balls. (Pposterior (L=10) = 0.999990).

The two urn case constitutes an uncontroversial application of Bayes' theorem. It is based on the two following competing hypotheses:

	(H1few)	the urn contains 10 balls
	(H2many)	the urn contains 1000000 balls

and the corresponding prior probabilities: P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5. Taking into account the fact that E denotes the available evidence that the random ball is #7 and P(H1|E) = 1/10 and P(H2|E) = 1/1000000, a bayesian shift ensues from a straightforward application of Bayes' theorem. As a result, the posterior probability is such that P'(H1) = 0.99999.
Let us consider, on the other hand, the human situation corresponding to DA​[4]​:

(...) now consider the case where instead of the urns you have two possible human races, and instead of balls you have individuals, ranked according to birth order. As a matter of fact, you happen to find that your rank is about sixty billion. Now, say Carter and Leslie, we should reason in the same way as we did with the urns. That you should have a rank of sixty billion or so is much more likely if only 100 billion persons will ever have lived than if there will be many trillion persons. Therefore, by Bayes' theorem, you should update your beliefs about mankind's prospects and realise that an impending doomsday is much more probable than you have hitherto thought.

It is apparent that the corresponding human situation leads to the two following hypotheses: 

	(H3few)	the total human population will reach 1011
	(H4many)	the total human population will reach 1014

Call this situation the (human) situation corresponding to DA. In this case, the prior probabilities are such that P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5 and E denotes the fact that your birth rank is 60x109. An application of Bayes' theorem, taking into account the fact that P(H1|E) = 1/1011 and P(H2|E) = 1/1014, leads to a vigorous bayesian shift: P'(H1) = 0.999.
According to Carter and Leslie, the human situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the two urn case. And this leads to a vigorous bayesian shift in favor of the hypothesis that Doom will occur soon. For this reason, the Carter-Leslie line of thought can be summarized as follows:

	(5)	in the two urn case, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues
	(6)	the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the two urn case
	(7)	 in the situation corresponding to DA, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues

From the Carter-Leslie's viewpoint, the analogy with the urn is well-grounded. And this legitimates DA's conclusion according to which a bayesian shift in favor of doom soon ensues.


2. The Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers Analysis

A line of objection to the Doomsday Argument initially raised by William Eckhardt (1993, 1997) and recently echoed by George Sowers (2002) and Eliott Sober (2002) runs as follows. The analogy with the urn at the origin of DA, so the objection goes, is ill-grounded. For in the two urn case, the ball number is randomly chosen. But in the human situation corresponding to DA, our birth rank is not randomly chosen, but rather indexed on the corresponding temporal position. Hence, the analogy is ill-grounded and the whole reasoning is invalid. Eckhardt notably stresses on the fact that it is impossible to make a random selection when there exists numerous unborn members in the chosen reference class​[5]​. Sober (2002) argues along the same lines​[6]​, by pointing out that no mechanism having the effect of randomly assigning a temporal location to human beings, can be exhibited. Lastly, such a line of objection has been recently revived by Sowers. He emphasizes that the birth rank of each human is not random, because it is indexed on the corresponding temporal position​[7]​.
In parallel, according to the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers analysis, the human situation corresponding to DA is not analogous to the two urn case, but rather to the consecutive token dispenser initially described by Eckhardt​[8]​:

(...) suppose on each trial the consecutive token dispenser expels either 50 (early doom) or 100 (late doom) consecutively numbered tokens at the rate of one per minute.

A similar device is also mentioned by Sowers​[9]​:

There are two urns populated with balls as before, but now the balls are not numbered. Suppose you obtain your sample with the following procedure. You are equipped with a stopwatch and a marker. You first choose one of the urns as your subject. It doesn't matter which urn is chosen. You start the stopwatch. Each minute you reach into the urn and withdraw a ball. The first ball withdrawn you mark with the number one and set aside. The second ball you mark with the number two. In general, the nth ball withdrawn you mark with the number n. After an arbitrary amount of time has elapsed, you stop the watch and the experiment. In parallel with the original scenario, suppose the last ball withdrawn is marked with a seven. Will there be a probability shift? An examination of the relative likelihoods reveals no.

Thus, according to the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers line of thought, the human situation corresponding to DA is not analogous to the two urn case, but rather to the consecutive token dispenser. And in this last model, the prior probabilities of the two alternative hypotheses Hfew and Hmany remain unchanged. Hence, the corresponding line of reasoning goes as follows:

	(8)	in the consecutive token dispenser, the prior probabilities remain unchanged
	(9)	the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the consecutive token dispenser
	(10)	 in the situation corresponding to DA, the prior probabilities remain unchanged

thus yielding P(Hfew) = P'(Hfew) and P(Hmany) = P'(Hmany).


3. The Analogy with the Urn

As we have seen, according to the Carter-Leslie view, DA is based on an analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the two urn case. By contrast, from the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers standpoint, the analogy associates the human situation corresponding to DA and the consecutive token dispenser. In what follows, I shall argue that both analogies suffer from some defects and consequently do not prove fully adequate. This leads finally to reformulating the analogy more accurately.
Consider, first, the analogy with the two urn case inherent to the Carter-Leslie view. Let us begin with the characteristics of the human situation corresponding to DA. A summary analysis shows indeed that this last situation is temporal. In effect, the birth ranks are successively attributed to human beings in function of the temporal position corresponding to their appearance on Earth. Thus, the corresponding situation takes place, say, from T1 to Tn, 1 and n being respectively the rank number of the first and of the last human. By contrast, the two urn case is atemporal, for at the moment where the ball is randomly drawn, all balls are already present in the urn​[10]​. Consequently, the two urn case takes place at a given time T0. To sum up now. The situation corresponding to DA needs to be modeled in a temporal model, while the two urn case must be rendered in an atemporal model. In short, the situation corresponding to DA being temporal, and the two urn case being atemporal precludes us from regarding the two situations as isomorphic​[11]​. At this step, it is apparent that the human situation corresponding to DA being temporal should be put in analogy more accurately with a temporal experiment.
Let us investigate now how the preceding inconvenient could be overcome. Consider then the following experiment:

The incremental two urn case An urn contains either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The total number of balls in the urn is unknown to you. At time T0, you blindly draw a ball #e from the urn. A second experiment is then carried out, which takes place at irregular intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn. A device expels at T1 the ball #1, at T2 the ball #2..., at Tn the ball #n. Now, according to the result of the first experiment realized in T0, the device stops when the ball #e is expelled. At this step, you try to evaluate the number of balls which were contained in T0 in the first urn. You formulate the two following assumptions:

(H11few)	the number of balls contained in the urn is 10
(H12any)	the number of balls contained in the urn is 1000

and you conclude to an upwards bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew hypothesis.

At this step, it is worth analyzing with scrutiny the consequences of the above experiment. It should be noted first that such an experiment does not face the above mentioned criticisms concerning the analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the two urn case. For it has been shown that the human situation corresponding to DA, being temporal, can not be put in analogy with the two urn case, which is atemporal. By contrast, the incremental two urn case is a temporal experiment. Thus, the incremental two urn case meets the above mentioned requirements concerning the analogy. Hence, it is apparent that the incremental two urn case can be legitimately put in analogy with the human situation corresponding to DA. In this context, we now face a variation of DA which can be summarized as follows:

	(13)	in the incremental two urn case, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues
	(14)	the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the incremental two urn case
	(15)	 in the situation corresponding to DA, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew prevails

And this last variation is not vulnerable to the above objection. The analogy with the urn is now plainly plausible, since both situations are temporal.

Consider, second, the analogy with the consecutive token dispenser, which is characteristic of the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers line of thought. Eckhardt describes the consecutive token dispenser, where the tokens are expelled from the urn at constant intervals of time ('one per minute'). Sowers describes an analogous experiment, which can be termed the numbered ball dispenser, where the balls are expelled from the urn and numbered accordingly,  at the constant rate of one per minute. In this last experiment, the balls are numbered in the order of their expulsion from the urn. Nevertheless, both Eckhardt's and Sowers' experiments do not exactly correspond to the human situation corresponding to DA. For in this last situation, the humans appear on Earth at variable intervals of time. At this step, it is apparent that this second analogy also stands in need of refinement, in order to fit more adequately with the intrinsic features of the human situation corresponding to DA.
However, this can be regarded as a minor qualm. For both Eckhardt's and Sowers' experiments can be restated with items that are expelled at irregular rates instead of constant ones. Consider, for example, Sowers' numbered ball dispenser. One could consider alternatively a variation of the numbered ball dispenser where the tokens are expelled from the urn at irregular intervals of time and where the balls' numbers correspond to the rank of their expulsion from the urn. For the sake of argument, call such a variation the irregular numbered ball dispenser. It appears then that the irregular numbered ball dispenser is not vulnerable to the above mentioned objection.
At this step, it is also worth considering the consequences of the incremental two urn case described above on the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers analysis. For in the incremental two urn case, the number of each ball expelled from the second device is indexed on the rank of its expulsion. For example, you draw the ball #60000000000. But you also know that the preceding ball was the ball #59999999999 and that the penultimate ball was the ball #59999999998, etc. However, this does not prevent you from reasoning in the same way as in the classical two urn case and from concluding to a bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis. In this context, the incremental two urn case has the following consequence: the fact of being time-indexed does not entail that the ball number is not randomly chosen. Contrast now with the central claim of the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers analysis that the birth rank of each human is not randomly chosen, but rather indexed on the corresponding temporal position. Sowers in particular considers thus that the cause of DA is the time-indexation of the number corresponding to the birth rank.​[12]​ But what the incremental two urn case and the corresponding analogy demonstrates, is that our birth rank can be time-indexed and nevertheless considered as random for DA purposes. And this point can be regarded as a significant objection to Sowers' analysis. This last remark lead to consider that the concrete analysis notably presented by Sowers does not prove however sufficient to solve DA. For the problem is revived when one considers the analogy between on the one hand, the human situation corresponding to DA and on the other hand, the irregular incremental two urn case. One can think that it is this last analogy which constitutes truly the core of the DA-like reasoning. In this context, Sowers' conclusion according to which his analysis leads to the demise of DA appears far too strong. Echoing Eckhardt, he has certainly provided additional steps leading towards the resolution of DA and clarified significant points, but Sowers' analysis does not address veritably the strongest formulations of DA.


4. A Third Route

Given the above developments, we are now in a position to examine with scrutiny the version of DA based on a analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the (irregular) incremental two urn case. As we have seen, this last version constitutes a strong variation of the argument in the sense that it is not open, first, to the charge of putting in correspondence an atemporal model with a temporal situation. This last variation is not vulnerable, second, to the objection that results from the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers analysis, according to which our birth rank is not random because it is time-indexed. Let us now question whether the human situation corresponding to DA is analogous or not to the (irregular) incremental two urn case. According to this novel formulation of DA, the question that arises is the following: are the situation corresponding to DA and the (irregular) incremental two urn case fully isomorphic?
At this step, it appears that the part of the experiment that takes place from to T1 to Tn proves fully analogous with the human situation corresponding to DA. Both situations are temporal and relate to numerous objects (or individuals), the number of which is that of their expulsion (or birth) rank. In this sense, the analogy proves strongly established. Nevertheless, it should be observed that some trouble emerges when one considers the situation that takes place at T0. For in the incremental two urn case, a random selection of a numbered ball is made at that very moment. Such a random selection takes place with absolute certainty at T0. But does an analogous random selection take place with the same degree of certainty at the eve of the beginning of humankind? The answer is no. For we lack any proof that the birth rank of future humans is determined by a random selection having occurred just before the beginning of humankind. In other words, has God​[13]​ gathered the souls of all future humans before the existence of humankind and determined the birth rank of each future human by a random selection? Do we have any evidence that such random selection has occurred just before the birth of the first human? No. We currently lack evidence of any such random process. In the case of the human situation corresponding to DA, the occurrence of any such random selection remains fully hypothetical. Hence, it can be concluded that there exists an important disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the incremental two urn case. This disanalogy concerns on the one hand, the situation that has occurred just before the appearance of humankind and on the other hand, the experiment that takes place at T0 in the incremental two urn case. While the occurrence of a random selection is known with absolute certainty in this last situation, the occurrence of an analogous random selection just before the appearance of humankind remains highly hypothetical.
At this step, it is also worth evaluating alternatively the analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the (irregular) numbered ball dispenser. Just as with the incremental two urn case, it appears that the part of the experiment that takes place from to T1 to Tn is fully analogous with the human situation corresponding to DA. This should not be surprising, since this last sequence is also included in the incremental two urn case experiment. But it also appears that there exists a striking difference between the human situation corresponding to DA and the (irregular) numbered ball dispenser. This difference concerns the event occurring at T0. For in the numbered ball dispenser, no event occurs at T0. And such a property of the numbered ball dispenser is known with absolute certainty. By contrast, what has occurred at the period preceding the existence of humankind remains indeterminate. Given its intrinsic nature, this period is full of uncertainty. Whether or not God has gathered the souls of all future humans before the appearance of humankind and fixed accordingly the birth rank of each future human by a random selection, remains a mere conjecture. Call  an event of this type, where a random selection is made. It should be pointed out that such an event seems highly unlikely. But are we allowed to rule out the possibility of any such event on rational grounds? No. For we lack evidence of the contrary. On the basis of the evidence at our disposal, we can not consider with absolute certainty that such a random selection has not occurred, nor that it has occurred. Hence, the probability of any such event just before the birth of humankind is indeterminate, i. e. formally, 0 < P() < 1.
What precedes casts light on the crucial point that the experiment analogous to the human situation corresponding to DA should reflect this last property, namely that 0 < P() < 1. The model on which the human situation corresponding to DA is based should allow for the hypothetical occurrence of an event leading to a random selection. For neither the incremental two urn case nor the numbered ball dispenser allow for this last possibility. In effect, the incremental two urn case is based on P() = 1, and the (irregular) numbered ball dispenser relies on P() = 0. Both models do not reflect the crucial fact that in the human situation corresponding to DA, the occurrence of an -type event is purely hypothetical, i. e. such that 0 < P() < 1.
At this point, we are in a position to describe a model for the human situation corresponding to DA which is not open to the charge of not reflecting the hypothetical occurrence of an -type event.

The hypothetical incremental two urn case This experiment contains two distinct parts. An urn contains either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The total number of balls in the urn is unknown to you. The first part of the experiment takes place hypothetically, according to a probability of, say 0.0001, but the second part occurs with absolute certainty. The first part corresponds to the following protocol. At time T0, you blindly draw a ball #e at random from the urn.
The second part of the experiment is as follows. At irregular intervals of time, namely from T1 to Tn, a device expels at T1 the ball #1, at T2 the ball #2..., at Tn the ball #n. Now, if the first part of the experiment has not occurred, the device stops when the ball #x is expelled, x being an arbitrarily chosen number. By contrast, if the first part of the experiment has occurred, the device stops when the ball #e is expelled, according to the result of the first experiment realized in T0.
At this step, you try to evaluate the number of balls which were contained in T0 in the urn. You formulate the two initially equally probable​[14]​ assumptions:

(H16few)	the number of balls contained in the urn is 10
(H17any)	the number of balls contained in the urn is 1000

and you conclude, with a probability of 0.0001, to an upwards bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis.

At this point, it should be apparent that this last experiment encapsulates both the (irregular) incremental two urn case and the (irregular) numbered ball dispenser. For if the first part of the experiment takes place, the situation becomes an incremental two urn case. And alternatively, if the first part does not occur, we are left with a numbered ball dispenser. Let us analyze then the hypothetical incremental two urn case in more detail. On the one hand, the situation that takes place from T1 to Tn does reflect the part of the human situation corresponding to DA that takes place from the beginning of humankind​[15]​ to our current birth. On the other hand, the characteristics of the situation that takes place at T0 now correspond adequately to our current situation. In the lack of evidence that P() = 0 or conversely that P() = 1, we currently face a probability such that 0 < P() < 1. However, it seems reasonable to retain a very small probability for  such that for example P() = 0.0001. This last low probability takes into account the fact that we assume that the world is fully deterministic and that the reference class​[16]​ that is the object of  corresponds to the prior probabilities P(Hfew) and P(Hany).
Finally, this leads to the following line of reasoning:

	(18)	in the hypothetical incremental two urn case, a negligible bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues
	(19)	the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the hypothetical incremental two urn case
	(20)	 in the situation corresponding to DA, a negligible bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew prevails

in replacement of the steps (5)-(7) of the Carter-Leslie line of reasoning and of the steps (8)-(10) of the Eckhardt-Sober-Sowers line of argument. What results now from this novel analysis, is that a conditional and negligible bayesian shift ensues, to the difference of the standard DA, which yields a vigorous bayesian shift. The calculation now gives: P'(Hfew) = P(Hfew)] + [[0.99 - 0.5]  * 0.0001] = 0.500049.
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^1	  The solution to DA presented here is a somewhat condensed version of the ideas developed in Franceschi (2002), that also discusses at length the problems related to DA: God's Coin Toss, the Sleeping Beauty problem, the Shooting-Room Paradox, the Presomptuous Philosopher.
^2	  Cf. Korb & Oliver (1998).
^3	  More precisely, Leslie considers an analogy with the lottery case.
^4	  From Bostrom (1997).
^5	  Cf. (1997, p. 256): 'How is it possible in the selection of a random rank to give the appropriate weight to unborn members of the population?'.
^6	  Cf. (2002, p. 9): 'But who or what has the propensity to randomly assign me a temporal location in the duration of the human race? There is no such mechanism.'.
^7	  Cf. (2002, p. 40): 'My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time correlation is established (...).' and also (2002, p. 44): 'The doomsday argument has been shown to be fallacious due to the incorrect assumption that you are a random sample from the set of all humans ever to have existed.'.
^8	  Cf. (1997, p. 251).
^9	  Cf. (2002, p. 39).
^10	  It could be pointed out that a small amount of time is necessary to perform the bayesian shift, once the problem's data are known. But this can be avoided if one considers ideal thinkers, who perform bayesian shifts at the time when they are informed of the elements of the situation.
^11	  I borrow this terminology from Chambers (2001).
^12	  Cf. Sowers (2002, p. 40): 'My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time correlation is established in essentially the same way that the stopwatch process established a correlation with the balls.'.
^13	  We can also imagine alternatively a purely physical device that has the effect of doing such a random selection.
^14	  For the sake of simplicity, P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5.
^15	  To be accurate: from the beginning of the chosen reference class.
^16	  For a treatment of the reference class problem, see notably Eckhardt (1993, 1997), Bostrom (2002, ch. 4 pp. 69-72 and ch. 5), Franceschi (1999). But the standard view is that it only weakens DA (notably by making the initially associated terror disappear), without dissolving it. Leslie's treatment of the reference class problem is exposed in Leslie (1996), in the part entitled 'Just who should count as being human?' (pp. 256-63). 
^17	  I thank Claude Panaccio and Jean-Paul Delahaye for very useful discussions.
